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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ever since Thucydides justified his history by proclaiming the Peloponnesian War a great war and an epochal event for  humanity, 
analysts of events occurring in their own time and place have risked 
accusations of hubris for similar claims. Nonetheless, the first years of the 
twenty-first century seem to portend epochal caesurae. The end of the 
half-millennium-old world capitalist system and the emerging dominance 
of a new form of communication and consciousness qualify these years as 
a time of a dramatic break with the past.
According to Immanuel Wallerstein (2004), the world capitalist system 
began at the start of the sixteenth century and was centered in Western 
Europe. It appears to have entered its death throes at the start of the 
twenty-first century. An even greater change involves the transformation of 
communication. Writing emerged as the dominant communicative form 
about two-and-a-half millennia ago, and printing about the same time 
as capitalism; together they formed a logocentric form of consciousness. 
Midway through the twentieth century, an iconocentric con sciousness 
began to displace logocentrism. Logocentrism is a writing-based commu-
nicative form and iconocentrism is image based.
The chapters that follow concentrate on the United States as a principal 
site of these changes. The United States is and has been the vanguard for 
modern capitalism and the place where iconographic communication has 
developed exuberantly. This is not to say that other countries and regions 
do not participate in the changes, but the United States remains the 
pacesetter and the hegemon.
Systems of political economy and consciousness do not seamlessly 
 succeed one another. Typically, an interregnum intervenes. During such 
interregna, chaos prevails. Among the characteristics of chaotic interregna 
are “wild fluctuations in all the institutional arenas. . . . The world-economy 
is subject to acute speculative pressures . . . [and a] high degree of violence is 
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erupting everywhere” (Wallerstein 2004:87). Most people adjust by relying 
on short-term adaptations using customary methods and strategies. Class 
conflict, as has been the case throughout recorded history, continues to pre-
vail. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it takes the form of “the 
struggle between the spirit of Davos and the spirit of Porto Alegre” (88). 
In the struggle over the system (or systems) that will succeed our existing 
world-system, the fundamental cleavage will be between those who wish to 
expand both liberties—that of the majority and that of the minorities—
and those who seek to create a non-libertarian system under the guise of 
preferring either liberty of the majority or the liberty of minorities. In 
such a struggle, it becomes clear what the role of opacity is in the struggle. 
Opacity leads to confusion, and this favors the cause of those who wish to 
limit liberty (89). 
Needless to say, the ruling classes of the current era favor the nonlibertar-
ian solution. Furthermore, the role of opacity in obscuring communication 
along with analytic and strategic thought looms even larger because of the 
shift from logocentric consciousness to iconocentric consciousness.
While far from resolved, trends and developments in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century favor the nonlibertarian solution. Police state 
controls, pervasive surveillance, and mass incarceration grow apace in the 
United States. At the same time, the U.S. military spreads war, terror, and 
torture in a desperate attempt to maintain its elites and their influence 
over the rest of humanity.
The Risk Society
The Trinity explosion began the risk society on July 16, 1945, in the Jornada 
del Muerto (Journey of Death) desert near Almogordo, New Mexico. It was 
the first test of the atomic bomb. Three weeks later, on August 6, 1945, the 
United States used another atomic bomb to destroy the city of Hiroshima, 
and three days after that, a third bomb blasted Nagasaki.
Ulrich Beck (1986) popularized the term “risk society” to describe a 
social shift from the past when the main hazards faced by humans came 
from the natural world. In the new social world, the main hazards are from 
human products. Beck proposed five principles of the risk society.
First, risks threaten systemic and irreversible harm. Most hazards, 
according to Beck, used to be personal, whereas in the risk society they 
are global. Furthermore, they are often beyond ordinary direct detection. 
For instance, in the case of nuclear explosives, much harm comes from 
 invisible radiation. Beck gave the example of odors in medieval cities as 
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the old style risk: “[H]azards in those days assaulted the nose or the eyes 
and were thus perceptible to the senses, while the risks of civilization today 
typically escape perception and are localized in the sphere of physical and 
chemical formulas”(21). Beck’s bad history and bad science on this last 
point are addressed below.
The second of Beck’s principles refers to a boomerang effect of risks. 
Accordingly, those social strata that initially benefit from producing risks 
eventually turn back and threaten them (23). Genetically modified food 
might exemplify this proposition as the U.S. corporate leaders who profit 
from the products may one day find themselves eating the hazardous food 
they produce. This second principle also relates to the global character 
of modern risks, a communality of fear and insecurity (Van Brunschot, 
Gibbs, and Kennedy 2008:29). 
Third, modern risks create a positive feedback loop in which risks cre-
ate more risks. Modern risks are infinite and create infinite demands for 
reducing them (Beck 1986:23). Risk management has become profitable 
with the ever-expanding market.
Fourth, risk has become the arbiter of social stratification, replacing 
the old class and status system based on unequal distribution of scarce 
resources. In this view, danger, not scarcity, determines social position 
and relations. Moreover, knowledge of risks has become commodified, 
a commodity not everyone can afford, because so far as scientists do not 
recognize risks, they do not exist as social artifacts (Beck 1989:100). This 
means that scientific risk experts have a monopoly on defining what 
dangers society contains. Those who lack technical expertise must rely on 
those who have it, thus removing much of the critical discourse about risk 
from popular politics (1986:71–72).
Fifth, risk pervades public spaces. Private security measures have 
increasingly replaced public safety. This point relates to social stratifica-
tion, as those lower in the social order must rely on more on public space 
and public safety.
These five principles operate as propositions in Beck’s theory of risk. 
They ignore historical reality. Each one makes an invalid distinction 
between archaic kinds of risks and modern risks. Beck’s example of medi-
eval odors neglects the fact that odors, though noxious, are not dangerous, 
whereas a good many serious health hazards provide no direct sensory 
evidence. Moreover, medieval hazards were no less systemic or global. 
The Black Death of the fourteenth century, which devastated Europe, came 
from Asia. The plague bacillus is not directly detectable, and even if it were, 
the public consensus did not have a germ theory of disease (Slack 1988). The 
Black Death tended to strike differentially—according to social stratification. 
The wealthy and mobile were more able to escape than impoverished masses 
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as recounted by Chaucer. Each of Beck’s five propositions suffers from simi-
lar fatal weaknesses. Therefore, why did his risk society thesis gain so much 
intellectual purchase? The answer lies in his political economic theory.
Beck’s political economic theory is anti-Marxist and neoliberal, with 
neoconservative implications. He revealed in his argument that the risk 
society “set [people] free from the social forms of industrial society . . . 
just as during the Reformation people were ‘released’ from the secular 
rule of the Church into society” (Beck 1986:87). He outlined his political 
economy in seven theses. First, welfare states of the West dissolved “class 
culture and consciousness, gender and family roles.” This brought on 
“a social surge of individualization” (87);  second, “ties to a social class recede 
mysteriously into the background. . . . Status-based social milieus and 
lifestyles . . . lose their luster”; third, “[t]his tendency to the  ‘classlessness’ 
of social inequality appears as a textbook example in the distribution of 
mass unemployment” (88); fourth, “[t]he ‘freeing’ relative to status-like 
social classes is joined by a ‘freeing’ relative to gender status. . . . The spiral 
of individualization is thus taking hold inside the family”; fifth, “as indus-
trial society triumphs, it has always promoted the dissolution of family 
morality, its gender fates, its taboos relative to marriage parenthood and 
sexuality, even the reunification of housework and wage labor” (89); sixth, 
“[t]he place of hereditary estates is no longer taken by social classes. . . . 
The individual himself or herself becomes the reproduction unit of the social 
in the lifeworld. . . . What the social is and does has to be involved with 
individual decisions”; seventh, and finally, individualization becomes “a 
historically contradictory process of socialization . . . social movements and 
citizens’ groups are formed in relation to modernization risks and risk 
situations” (90). 
In sum, Beck confused class and status, offering a bizarre mix of 
classical-political economic theory derived from Smith and Ricardo with 
a social phenomenology based on Husserl and Schutz. Beck offers a ver-
sion of Francis Fukuyama’s end of history thesis (1992), with its grounding 
in Alexander Kojève and Leo Strauss’ neoconservatism (Derrida 1993). 
The popularity of Beck’s concepts goes hand in hand with the neoliberal 
bent of the late twentieth century and its neoconservative culmination 
in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, the concept of 
risk has its utility in analyzing contemporary social trends. The British 
anthropologist Mary Douglas developed her concepts of risk about the 
same time as Beck, but with greater relevance to social reality.
Mary Douglas prefaced her 1992 collection of essays, Risk and Blame, 
by saying “The day anthropologists give up their attempt to ground mean-
ings in politics and economics will be a sad day” (ix). In the modern 
contemporary world, “[w]e have disengaged dangers from politics and 
INTRODUCTION   5
ideology, and deal with them by the light of science” (4). As Douglas goes 
on to show, before we moderns in industrialized societies become blinded 
by complacency about our superior intellectual grasp, it would be well 
to examine how we, in fact, bend science to the same political and ideo-
logical uses as the taboo-thinking of people from other kinds of societies 
and other times. Different types of cultures offer three different kinds of 
explanations for misfortunes: the morality of the victim, the work of indi-
vidual adversaries in the same society, and the work of outside enemies. 
The kind of explanation and a society’s system of justice “are symptoms of 
the way the society is organized” (6). In complex, modern, industrialized 
societies, people use all three kinds of explanations, sometimes even for 
the same misfortune. Such societies are not governed by rational, scientific 
dedication to projects designed for the common good; occasionally a bit 
of such an orientation creeps into public policies. As Douglas pointed out, 
the taboo-thinking linking danger and morals did not come from lack of 
knowledge. “Knowledge always lacks. Ambiguity always lurks . . . there are 
always loopholes for reading the evidence right.” Science has not banished 
the urge to dominate; industrialization has not deconstructed the rhetoric 
of fear and danger (9). The kinds of dangers identified and the people 
deemed dangerous reflect social structure and the values that sustain it. The 
elite always have right on their side; the marginalized are always to blame.
The reintroduction of the concept of risk may have to do with the revival 
of laissez-faire economics (Lowi 1990). The new meaning of risk, however, 
differed from the one prevailing when laissez-faire economic theory was 
new. Then, it meant great chance—the possibility of great gain or loss. 
Currently, in the sense developed by Beck, usage restricts it to hazard or dan-
ger. Meanings, especially of index concepts like “risk,” change as the momen-
tum of interlocutors shift with respect to the fulcrum of social change. 
These debates often pertain to investments in new technologies, decisions 
to invade, refuse immigration, or to license or withhold consent (Douglas 
1992:24). The modern, Beckian concept of risk helps protect vested indi-
vidualized interests in an individualistic culture such as that of the contem-
porary United States with its expansive capitalist enterprises (28). Along 
with risks comes blame. Lately, the blameworthy look like foreigners who 
hail from oil-rich territories coupled with marginalized, redundant minori-
ties and impoverished Whites in U.S. urban and rural ghettos. Timothy 
McVeigh joins Jose Padilla, Willie Horton, and the Saudi hijackers of 9/11.
Moral Fears
Building on the seminal work of George Herbert Mead and Georg 
Simmel in the first decades of the twentieth century, some social scientists 
6  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
 developed an analytics that focuses on social transactions or interactions. 
Some of the best-known work coming from these interactionists pays spe-
cial attention to deviance. Deviance refers to people and their acts falling 
outside of norms. Erving Goffman, in his study of social stigma, identified 
encounters between normals and deviants as constituting a “primal scene 
of sociology” (1963:13). It is primal because the encounter makes visible 
a founding moment of society; their mutual discomfort shows what most 
routine encounters obscure. Not knowing what another person might do 
makes every social encounter a potential danger, as in the incident when 
a distraught tenant shot at Georg Simmel as he approached a property he 
was managing for his uncle (Frisby 1992:103). A society’s moral system 
offers a general framework for evaluating other individuals, and its norms 
offer behavioral rules for social encounters. Violations of the rules create 
deviance, and those whom others perceive as engaging in the violation 
become deviants.
Critics of the interactionist approach say that it only provides micro-
sociological accounts without connecting interpersonal, small groups to 
larger, macrosociological concepts. While much interactionist work focuses 
on microinteractions, its explanatory power connects with macrosociolog-
ical processes. In her comparative examination of French and U.S. cities, 
Sophie Body-Gendrot argues for just such a link between quotidian life in 
urban settings and globalization. She relies on the concept of fractals or 
Mandelbrot sets, named after the mathematician Benoît Mandelbrot. As 
Body-Gendrot explains, fractal figures have parts that are the same shape 
as the whole but on a different scale. She claims that the fractal concept 
is more than just a metaphor; it defines a model for social organization. 
“It seems that our current societies are undergoing the same process 
of differentiation leading to continuous fractalization and to the same 
unbalance, ‘chaotic order,’ and constant readjustment” (Body-Gendrot 
2000:21). The fractal model harks back to Simmel’s determination to found 
a sociology around the concept of social forms (Simmel 1950:40–57). 
In a similar manner, I argue that interactionist concepts are useful in 
helping explain the epochal change in social organization and the current 
chaotic interlude before new world systems emerge. 
In his investigation of such deviants, or “outsiders,” Howard Becker 
observed that the legislation of rules does not fall from the sky; it is the 
work of what he propitiously called moral entrepreneurs. Their prototype 
is the crusading reformer (1973:147). Upon the institutionalization of 
new rules, rule enforcers police them (155). Becker’s structural analysis 
of deviance has borne fruit in case studies, such as Joseph Gusfield’s on 
temperance (1963) and drunk driving (1981) and Stephen Pfohl’s on child 
abuse (1977) to cite some of the better known ones. Studies of deviance, 
INTRODUCTION   7
or as Alexander Liazos (1972) sardonically remarked, “nuts, sluts, and 
perverts,” often abstracted the deviance process, and therefore neglected 
the context of social struggle. The kinds of people and milieus tend to 
be the detritus of profound, and often violent, social conflicts (Piven 1981), 
the walking wounded. As Becker pointed out in his original analysis, moral 
entrepreneurs, moral interpreters, and rule makers are not drawn from hoi 
polloi; they are, or represent, societies’ elites. Deviance is not conferred by just 
anyone, but by those who have the greatest stake in either keeping the status 
quo or sometimes moving it backward to a previous one. The better students 
of deviance recognized this fact all along. Deviance making is an exercise in 
social power, to keep it or get more of it. Stanley Cohen (1980) introduced 
the phrase “moral panics” to designate the construction of a moral state of 
emergency as part of elitist power strategies, which called for quick social 
rule making and rectification of class boundaries. Dario Melossi specified the 
historical sequence and class conflict context for such moral panics.
Melossi reinterpreted Rusche and Kirchheimer’s classic Punishment and 
Social Structure (1939) to account for U.S. criminal justice policies and 
practices since 1970. His thesis states that criminal justice becomes harsher 
when elites believe the working class is gaining political and economic 
strength. The elites respond as if this presented a moral crisis in society.
[L]abor insubordination tends to be interpreted by moral elites as an aspect 
of general moral malaise of society. . . . Agencies of social control . . . react 
to what they perceive as a moral crisis without necessarily being cognizant 
of the more immediate economic aspects of the crisis. . . . Therefore, follow-
ing social situations during which elites see their hegemony challenged, two 
things tend to happen simultaneously, apparently linked only in the murky 
atmosphere of a “public mood”: people work harder for less money, and 
prisons fill beyond capacity. 
(Melossi 1993:266)
Writing in 1993, Melossi limited his interpretation to the cycles of capital-
ism that go through periods of waxing and waning working-class strength. 
It is easy to expand his thesis. Instead of assuming the objectivity of a 
moral crisis, the morality crisis of the 1960s came from the elite’s reac-
tion to working-class strength of the postwar period. The same pattern 
of harsher state controls can apply to the current crisis of capitalism; in 
this case, it is not so much the strength of the working class as the profit-
ability squeeze. The elites create a moral crisis that takes several forms 
and replicates the three kinds of reactions to danger that Mary Douglas 
identified. First, outsiders, the impoverished, and economically dependent 
are blamed for their own moral failings. As Reaganism and Thatcherism 
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attacked welfare in the United States and Britain, in other countries, elites 
stirred up nativist reactions; second, while the welfare state shrunk, tending 
more toward a regulatory state (Braithwaite 2000; Rose 2000), redundant 
and dependent populations were demonized and dangerized (Lianos and 
Douglas 2000); third, terrorists became a new outside enemy. Terrorism 
replaced communism as the gravest threat to the capitalist world order. 
National moral panics and the moral crusades against a variety of deviants 
reflect the larger crisis of the world capitalist system. 
Modern Capitalism and Its Crises
Modern capitalism is industrial capitalism. It originated with the indus-
trial revolution and the national revolutions in America and France at the 
end of the eighteenth century. Chapter 2 briefly traces its history to its 
collapse in the twenty-first century. Marx’s analyses of capitalism contain 
two features salient to current and future social trends. First, capitalism 
depends on continual change, like a shark that must keep moving lest it 
drown. The point is captured in the following extracts:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instru-
ments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with 
them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of 
production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition 
of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of 
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting 
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier 
ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and vener-
able prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is 
holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his, 
real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
***
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the 
bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe.
***
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. 
(Marx and Engels 1848:207)
The second salient feature of capitalism is its falling rate of profit (Harvey 
2005). The more the capitalist system functions over time, the smaller will 
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be the rate of profit (Marx 1894, vol. 3, part III). When the overall rate of 
profit approaches zero, the moving shark of capitalism stalls and drowns.
Throughout the nineteenth century, capital expanded in Western 
Europe and North America mainly by exploiting domestic markets. 
A crisis struck toward the end of the nineteenth century leading to changes 
in the system. Domestic markets alone, especially in Europe, declined in 
profitability; competitive capitalism gave way to monopoly capitalism and 
imperialism (Lenin 1917); capitalism revitalized itself by monopolistic 
consolidation and neocolonialism in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.
The next crisis occurred in the period of 1968–1973. It was simultane-
ously an economic crisis brought on by rising wages and costs coupled 
with a political crisis. The uprisings of 1968 in Chicago, Mexico City, Paris, 
Prague, and other locations around the globe signaled the political part of 
the crisis. Capitalism once again found a solution in a reaction against the 
political demand, followed by what has come to be called globalization. 
Globalization brought modern capitalism to the least developed parts of 
the world, and invaded countries and regions that had called themselves 
communist, notably China, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Vietnam.
Reaganism and Thatcherism, neoliberal economics, and neoconserva-
tive politics replaced the liberal consensus that has governed the West since 
1848. “The cultural shock of 1968 unhinged automatic dominance of the 
liberal center. . . . The center abandoned the theme of developmentalism . . . 
and replaced it with the theme of globalization” (Wallerstein 2004:85–86). 
Without ascribing causative force, the attacks of September 11, 2001 (from 
here on 9/11), marked the end of the modern era and the beginning of 
postmodernity. As the capitalist world system founders, a chaotic period 
has ensued, marked by wild fluctuations in all institutions, acute specula-
tive pressures in the world economy, and outbreaks of violence, which do 
not surrender to conventional exercises of force by the leading imperialist 
states (87). The political-economic system of capitalism, which had come 
to dominate the world since its beginnings in the late eighteenth century, 
faces its death in the early years of the twenty-first century. At the same 
time, communication, culture, and consciousness have been changing at 
an accelerating pace in which the millennia-old reign of Logos is replaced 
by a new form, Iconos.
Spectacles and Icons
Historically, writing, laws, and the state coemerged. As bureaucratic 
social organizations, states need record keeping for such vital concerns 
as  taxation. Keeping fiscal and similar records typically intertwined 
with religious applications. The ancient empires—Egyptian, Mayan, 
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Mesopotamian, Indus and Ganges in India, and Chinese—exhibit writing 
systems that recorded matters of the heavens, conquests, successions, and 
similar imperial events, along with fiscal and administrative matters. These 
early imperial states often published written laws regulating all manner 
of life within their territorial purview. Consolidation of the state political 
form was logocentric from its beginning. Eric Havelock (1963) and Harold 
Innis (1950), among others, discussed the transition in ancient Greece 
from a dominant performative communicative form, Mythos, to a lexical 
one, Logos. The polis came to dominate the Greek political world along 
with Greek alphabetic writing. Formerly dominant performance, rather 
than suffusing all social institutions, became increasingly circumscribed 
into theater and, especially in Athens, political decision making and eco-
nomic exchange in the agora.
Just as the state and writing go hand in hand, early capitalism and 
printing appeared in Europe at about the same time. In the waning years of 
the fifteenth century, three technologies loosed the capitalist form on the 
world: moveable type, double-entry book keeping, and navigational and 
sailing ship refinements. Printed books and documents came from move-
able type. The ability to record investments and returns by bookkeeping 
was essential for tracking the lifeblood of capitalism—profit. Improved 
navigation, charting, and sailing made possible exploration and trade 
with Asia and Africa and also the exploitation of the Western hemisphere. 
The last greatly enlarged the European money economy making possible 
expanded trade with Asia.
The advent of modern industrial capitalism injected the commodity 
form into social relations. By the middle of the twentieth century, Guy 
Debord argued that the society of the spectacle prevailed. His argument 
proceeded as follows. First, societies where modern production prevails 
present a massive accumulation of spectacles. “All that once was directly 
lived has become mere representation. . . . The spectacle is not a collec-
tion of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is 
mediated by images” (Debord 1967:12). These mediating spectacles are 
signs of capitalist production. “The spectacle is capital accumulated to the 
point where it becomes image” (24). The society of the spectacle occurs 
when “the commodity completes its colonization of social life” (29). 
Debord relied heavily on Marx, especially Chapter I of Capital (1867). The 
same basic insights are found in Simmel’s Philosophy of Money (1900) and 
the widely anthologized “Metropolis and Mental Life” extracted from that 
larger work (1950). David Frisby (1992:167) quoted Christoph Asendorf 
(1993:95) as saying, “[p]reviously trusted things have become a plurality 
of commodities, about which one can relate nothing since they have no 
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history.” Following Debord, Marx, and Simmel, the history of modernity is 
the history of the commodification of all social relations.
Freud and George Herbert Mead claimed that the ego, or I in the case of 
Freud and the self for Mead, came from social relations. For both, those 
relations are mediated by signs. “[T]he character of the ego is a precipitate 
of abandoned object cathexes” (Freud 1923:19). “So the self reaches its full 
development . . . by thus becoming an individual reflection of the general 
systematic pattern of social or group behavior . . .” (Mead 1934:158). 
This line of thought together with the argument from Debord means 
that modern persons depend for their identities on commodity relations, 
which are disguised and occluded social relations in a capitalist system of 
production. 
Communicative forms began breaking away from the logocentric 
mediation by verbal symbols, during the twentieth century, accelerating 
with the advent of television midcentury. Instead of verbal symbols, images 
took over more of the communicative load. By the end of the  century, 
images began to edge out words. The iconic relation, where the sign is 
based on resemblance, brought people into the age of the  iconocentric. 
This development appears on the millions of computer screens that are 
dominated by icons. Social relations, already commodified, became image 
based. The shift from the modern to the post modern is a shift from logo-
centrism to iconocentrism.
Controlling the Masses
Elites have the upper hand despite their small numbers, because they can 
control the masses. Through the ages, they have relied on their position 
to shape and direct essential social institutions—the economy, politics, 
education, and so on. One of the most powerful of those institutions has 
been the state.
One view of the state emphasizes its role as arbiter. This Lockean 
kind of idea underlies the rationale for late modern neoliberalism. 
Conceiving of the state as arbiter limits its legitimate function to offer-
ing institutions for dispute resolution. To varying extents, political elites 
during the period of liberal consensus—from 1848 to the late twentieth 
 century—subscribed to this viewpoint. From time to time and place to 
place in the developed world, versions of more leftist orientation led to 
more social democracy and culminated in the welfare state in Europe 
and, to a lesser extent, North America. When the ideology of the liberal 
consensus began to unravel in the 1970s, the liberal consensus turned into 
neoliberal regulation.
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Always operating alongside the arbiter perspective, the other  ideological 
orientation about states took the Hobbesian approach. This viewpoint 
treats the state as the ultimate power. There are left versions of this. Among 
them, social theorists such Pierre Bourdieu, Foucault, and Habermas take 
a realist position. They critically analyze state power and, to some extent, 
discuss ways to limit it. Those of right political orientation take an apolo-
getic stance regarding state power. Neoconservative spokespeople went 
beyond apologias; they celebrated state power, advocating its extension 
into imperialistic adventures.
States rarely exercise power without institutionalizing it under law. The 
liberal governments Antonio Gramsci analyzed used their power as hege-
monic control. As opposed to authoritarian control, hegemony depends 
on maintaining widespread consensus. It does so by relying on the state’s 
role as arbiter. Instead of using forceful state apparatuses such as police 
and armies, the hegemonic state relies on setting the ground rules for what 
counts as truth, value, and legitimacy. Relatively subtle adjustments in law 
and other regulatory functions ensure continued elite supremacy while 
still keeping support of the masses.
Historically, the interwar period introduced a hiatus in the hegemonic 
development of the liberal state. Assorted authoritarian regimes arose. 
Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Stalinist Soviet Union exemplify them. 
They use two tactics. They terrify the masses with threats of enemies, both 
internal and external. To escape the monsters underneath the beds and the 
barbarians at the gates, the masses allow the state extraordinary power over 
themselves. In the United States, this tactic reveals itself as the promotion 
of the dual fears of crime and terrorism (Altheide 2002, 2006, 2009a).
The other tactic uses the machinery at the disposal of the state for direct 
physical control. Domestically, they increase police state tactics. Outside 
the metropolis, the massive armamentarium extends control by military 
force. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are part of the second tactic. 
Twenty-first century imperialism of this kind serves the same purposes 
as the military exercises used during the period of neocolonialism when 
Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, other capitalist states, extended 
control over markets and resources in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Fear 
and force operate in tandem to sustain the elites of the capitalist center in 
the United States, its Anglophone associates, and other capitalist centers 
in Europe and Japan. 
Law and Terrorism
The United States has built the largest counterterrorism establish-
ment in the world. It dates from the early 1980s when the first federal 
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 counterterrorism laws allowed the military to chase enemies anywhere 
on earth so long as they called them terrorists. After 9/11, the apparatus 
expanded with a massive reorganization of government agencies to go 
with military adventures and invasions. Other Anglophone, metropolitan 
countries, especially Great Britain and Australia; followed suit. In these 
countries, the counterterrorism apparatuses depend on laws and legal 
rationales. These legal structures contrast with regimes using authoritar-
ian and customary methods. Countries such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
and Syria do not put so fine a point on repressive measures as those where 
the common law offers a modicum of protection against state power.
Within the United States, a new government agency took over many 
internal control functions by absorbing formerly independent agen-
cies such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which became 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). Apparently lacking either a literary or histori-
cal sense of irony, U.S. legislators and bureaucrats missed the allusions to 
Kurt Vonnegut’s Ice-Nine (1963) or the Nazi RSHA (Reichsicherheitsamt), 
the central security apparatus of the SS. Other agencies and functions 
retained their independence like the FBI or turned from mainly foreign 
activities such as the National Security Agency (NSA) to devote more of 
their energies to surveilling Americans.
Carrying out the counterterrorism legal mandate in the United States 
has taken the form of rounding up the usual suspects. A swarm of inves-
tigations led to a string of prosecutions, resulting in few trials and con-
victions, many of which count as ludicrous while others are more tragic. 
John Walker Lind and Jose Padilla fit in the tragic category. Among the 
outrageous are the Lackawanna Six (Temple-Raston 2007), the Fort Dix 
case (Belczyk 2009), the so-called Virginia paintball terrorists sentenced 
to 15 and 20 years respectively (Fox News 2004), and the plight of Sami 
Al Arian (Shaulis 2008). The Detroit case, in which most convictions were 
reversed (Detroit News 2004), is somewhere between outrageous and just 
plain ludicrous as is the alleged plot to blow up the Sears Tower, which has 
yet to result in any convictions although federal prosecutors plan a third 
trial (New York Times 2009a). The case of Steve Kurtz almost fits in its own 
category as unbelievable unless one accepts the notion that the world is a 
very different place than most people think. He is an artist and art profes-
sor prosecuted for art terrorism (Duke 2004; New York Times 2008).
Because of its reliance on legal justifications, counterterrorism policies 
and practices by the United States government encountered jurispruden-
tial resistance. Various attempts to resist through legal means have used the 
Anglo-American traditions with their tools to limit state power, though 
a few recent court decisions affirmed basic rights. Despite some legal 
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 victories, the state remains the main actor in this type of social control. 
All others react to it.
Terror, Law, and Torture
As a generalization, states using torture also generate terror laws, often 
called anti- or counterterrorism; the United States is a case study of the 
phenomenon. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States 
developed torture expertise along with cadres of trained personnel. 
During the Cold War, it exported torture to allies and proxy regimes. In 
the last decades of the twentieth century, crime hysteria and an expansive 
crime-control apparatus prepared the U.S. populace to accept torture. The 
current war on terror combines U.S. imperialism and racism with an ideo-
logically prepared population and laws and organizations enabling the use 
of torture. Other states using torture may differ in historical particulars, 
but the generalization appears to hold, as it derives from expanding state 
control.
Recent revelations emanating from a variety of U.S. government agen-
cies and affiliated private organizations reveal their use of torture in con-
nection with the Global War on Terror, GWOT in government-speak. The 
manner of the revelations suggests torture is something new. It is not. 
The United States is a torturing nation. During the colonial era and 
the early republic period, America relied on torture as a way to control 
the indigenous population, convicts, indentured servants, and slaves. 
Once established in the nineteenth century, municipal police forces used 
torture as part of interrogations—the so-called third degree. After the 
Second World War, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies developed 
torture techniques and mind control as part of clandestine Cold War 
 tactics. The techniques were exported to authoritarian regimes, especially 
in Latin America, via the School of the Americas training center.
Although most commonly associated with interrogation, torture 
serves other purposes also. Deterrent torture discourages (or encourages) 
a population regarding certain activities. Before the Civil War, owners 
encouraged work by torturing slaves; after the Civil War, the freed slaves 
were discouraged from seeking betterment through torture and lynching. 
Another effect of torture aims at dehumanizing the victims to turn them 
into docile creatures. Simultaneously, it dehumanizes the torturers by bru-
talizing them. Deterrent and dehumanizing tortures represent concomi-
tant forms of terrorism. Imperialistic enterprises have relied on torture 
historically and in the present. It is not, therefore, accidental that reports 
of torture arose with the so-called counterterror wars against Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Torture remains part of the imperialist toolbox.
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Although the use of torture diametrically contradicts basic humanistic 
ideals of democracy—the Anglo-American legal tradition and what is pro-
moted as Americanism—public opinion in the United States generally 
supports its use. Torture has a certain populist appeal. Lynching was a 
populist practice, usually accompanied by torture. The widespread use 
of torture accompanying public executions under the Ancien Régime in 
Europe also attests to its popular appeal. American public opinion in its 
support draws on populist thirst for revenge and retribution.
Increasingly, documentary evidence shows that the G. W. Bush regime 
planned the use of torture. The intelligence agencies employed torture for 
all their main purposes—interrogation, deterrence, and dehumanizing. 
The political leadership relied on its populist appeal. While abjuring the 
former regime’s torture policies, the Obama regime has avoided investi-
gations and prosecutions. There remains a question about whether the 
practice has stopped.
Camps, Gallows, Ghettos, Gulags, and Prisons
Spatial restriction of targeted, marginalized populations is not new. Jewish 
ghettos had a long history in Europe before the Nazis established new 
ones as part of the Drang Nach Osten. Residential segregation grew in U.S. 
cities during the twentieth century. Lagers or concentration camps made 
their first appearance in the United States with Indian reservations (Biolsi 
2007). As a number of historians and social analysts have pointed out, 
prisons are a phenomenon of industrial capitalism.
Despite its motto as the land of the free, the United States today is the 
most incarcerating country in the world by a wide margin and may even 
hold first place in human history. Critiques of this mass incarceration 
point to multiple causative factors that have been interacting over several 
decades. In keeping with that multiple causation, contemporary mass 
incarceration in the leading capitalist society reflects a set of confluent 
social and cultural trends of late- and postmodernity.
Almost half of those currently imprisoned in the United States 
are African American, and most of them lived in the urban ghettos. The 
same holds true for other sequestered minorities, such as Latinos and 
Native Americans. The pattern suggests a conduit from ghetto to prison, 
greased by carceral practices in state apparatuses of control but made 
possible by the overall workings of the political economy that made those 
populations marginal and redundant in the first place. 
Another means of control does not use direct physical restraint. People 
on probation or parole, along with illegal aliens not captured by immigra-
tion authorities, make up a subpopulation whose mobility is not curtailed 
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but restricted. The rest of the population in the United States is subjected 
to increasing degrees of surveillance.
The mobile–but-surveilled majority face a barrage of electronic devices. 
National intelligence agencies in the United States use a variety of tech-
niques for eavesdropping. Cameras are coming into greater use. They 
already surveil most public places in urban Great Britain. In a sense, this 
mass surveillance reproduces the surveillance under the French Ancien 
Régime, except that instead of informers, the current approach relies 
on electronics. Another comparison is that of the German Democratic 
Republic during the Cold War with its STASI and their use of hundreds of 
thousands of informants.
Meanings of Capital Punishment
Persistence of capital punishment in the United States in the face of 
its abolition in most of the developed world offers a glimpse at the 
importance of fear by control agents. Most countries in the world have 
abolished  capital punishment. Many others have restricted it to excep-
tional crimes. Only a few, including the United States, still execute. With 
the possible exception of China, where the actual number of executions 
remains  uncertain, the death penalty cannot serve instrumental goals 
(Garland 2005). Studies have shown it has no deterrent effect, and pre-
cise talion retribution has always been impossible. Its main function is 
expressive.
China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States are among the most pro-
lific executioners. Capital punishment has different expressive roles in 
these countries according to their different cultural traditions. In China it 
demonstrates the importance of social cohesion. Chinese predominantly 
view it in terms of deterrence, both general and specific including death 
as incapacitation (Ho 2005; Jiang et al. 2007; Liang et al. 2006). In Saudi 
Arabia, it supports a religious and traditional autocratic regime, and in the 
United States, it serves as a form of revenge and terror.
Capital punishment has long been a form of state terror. The term 
“terrorism” is often traced to la Terreur of the French Revolution. 
Robespierre and Saint Just, both opponents of capital punishment generally, 
nonetheless led the terror and explained its necessity. After the counterrev-
olution of Thermidore, the White Terror terrorized the masses whereasthe 
Red terror (la Terreur) terrorized the aristocracy. (Mayer 2000).
Another famous historical episode of state terrorism came out of the 
Bolshevik Revolution. First, the various parties involved in the postrevo-
lutionary civil war used terror. Then, Stalin used legalized terrorism to 
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consolidate his power in the 1930s purges (Mayer 2000; Overy 2004; 
Thurston 1996).
Following the Chinese Revolution of 1949, Mao started the Cultural 
Revolution to eliminate vestiges of feudal hierarchy. Although the contin-
ued control of the Cultural Revolution by Mao and the party leadership 
remains disputed, in practice, terrorism was widely employed, including 
capital punishment. With the capitalist counterrevolution, the government 
leadership has used capital punishment to manage a potentially explosive 
social situation (Lu and Zhang 2005).
Religious rationales for capital punishment can be traditional, as in 
Saudi Arabia, or vengeful as in the United States. Traditional Koranic jus-
tice underpins the Saudi monarchy. In the United States, an overwhelm-
ingly Christian country both socially and culturally, capital punishment 
fulfills a fundamentalist creed. It also serves to terrorize marginalized 
populations as did lynching. In both religious and terroristic uses, it 
retains popular support (Lifton and Mitchell 2000; Sarat 2001). 
Even in abolitionist countries, public opinion still favors it. The history 
of abolition in Europe reveals the relation most clearly. Before its aboli-
tion, the public generally supported it; after its abolition support gradu-
ally declined (Zimring 2003). In Latin America, where the death penalty 
has been abolished longest, public opinion is nearly split (Briceño-León, 
Carmadiel, and Avila 2006). In contrast, public opinion in retentionist 
countries, including the United States and China, shows two-thirds to 
three-fourths in favor of capital punishment. Laws, politically framed dis-
courses, and public policy shape, channel, and articulate public opinion 
thereby giving form to the meaning of the death penalty.
The Emergence of  Iconocentric Dominance
Coupled with an epochal shift in the central and hegemonic political 
economy from capitalist to a postcapitalist world system, a revolution has 
begun to occur in communication and consciousness. This revolution 
shifts the form of communication from one that is logocentric, mainly 
represented by print, to one that is iconocentric, representation via images. 
Iconic representation refers to what C. S. Peirce identified as a kind of sign 
relation. He distinguished it from two others: the symbolic and the indexi-
cal (Deledalle 2000; Peirce 1960). This Peircean semiotic meaning of iconic 
representation differs from, but, to a degree, overlaps with the meaning of 
iconic associated with religious icons. In the overlapping area of meaning, 
analysis of the Biblical injunction against icons and iconoclastic move-
ments throughout history present opportunities to link iconic representa-
tion with social changes.
18  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
A number of thinkers have noted changes in communicative technol-
ogy. Perhaps the best known is Marshall McLuhan (1964; McLuhan and 
Fiore 1967), but he was preceded by his mentor Harold Innis (1951) who 
was contemporary with the classicist Eric Havelock. All three argued for 
a link between communicative technology and changing social relations, 
cultural forms, and consequently, changes in collective consciousness.
The argument begins with Havelock’s (1963, 1983) analysis of ancient 
Greek culture. He said that sometime in the seventh century BCE, Greek 
communication and thought shifted from one grounded in mythos to 
one built around logos. Mythos was a performative kind of thought and 
communication, which depended on presence. Logos was associated with 
writing. It allowed for increasing abstraction. Printing ushered in another 
era with attendant changes in communication, thought, and society. As 
McLuhan famously pointed out, the advent of electronic media in the 
twentieth century not only changed the way modern peoples commu-
nicate but also think. The electronic media’s pervasiveness has mediated 
all other forms of communication (Auslander 2008), and therefore, all 
social intercourse and social relations. Finally, computerized electronic 
communication began the process whereby the logocentric mode of com-
munication and thought gives way to the iconocentric—an image-based 
mode.
Therefore, twenty-first century postmodernity portends not only a 
postcapitalist world but also a postlogocentric one—an iconocentric 
world. These two shifts—the end of the capitalist world system and the 
end of logocentrism giving way to iconocentrism—mark the postmodern 
era in all social and cultural areas.
Such enormous changes would presumably produce generalized and 
diffuse anxieties, which people often displace onto more manageable 
and concrete entities—scapegoats of all kinds. Powerful elites use these 
anxieties; they magnify and exacerbate them for control of the masses. 
The ensuing period of chaos predicted by world-system theory may well 
lead to an oppressive future system, a police state style dystopia. There 
are, however, discourses of liberation that work against that eventuality. 
Those discourses use tools that heretofore mainly belonged to ruling elites. 
They rely on the broad ground of popular culture and will have to include 
increasing deployment of icons. The recent history of shifts in the arts and 
humanities provide a sense of direction for discourses of liberation.
Modernism to Postmodernism and beyond
Modernism should be distinguished from modernity. The latter refers to a 
period of social arrangements and technological developments beginning 
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roughly with the twentieth century. Modernism, on the other hand, takes 
in cultural developments in the arts and humanities. 
As cultural artifacts, the arts offer texts for nondiscursive reading. More 
subjective and context dependent, they yield differing perspectives on 
social realities. By adding perspectives, they permit more complete, and 
often more profound, analyses when coupled with traditional discursive 
sources. The arts represent social trends even as they contribute to shaping 
them. Historically, the arts have represented social trends before socio-
logical discourses have reported them (Best and Kellner 1997 citing Shlain 
1991; Jameson 1981).
Modernism and postmodernism have a number of different mean-
ings. In part, the differences arise from disciplinary orientations. They 
also depend on interpreters’ ideological orientations. Modernism usually 
refers to the cultural aspects of modern times. The beginning and end of 
the modern period reflects different interpretations including those of his-
tory, philosophy, and the social sciences. Different meanings of modern-
ism give way to an array of different meanings of postmodernism. Some 
interpreters deny the very existence of postmodernism. For the purpose of 
this book, modernism refers to cultural developments since the late nine-
teenth century. Impressionism in art and music, realism in literature, and 
Nietzsche in philosophy signaled the coming of modernity in the twenti-
eth century. Representative developments in other areas include relativity 
and quantum mechanics in physics, psychoanalysis, extensions of suffrage, 
and the establishment of sociological studies as an academic discipline.
Just as modernism in the arts anticipated modernity, so postmodern-
ism has anticipated postmodernity. For example, some analysts locate the 
earliest signs of postmodernism in the architectural trends of the 1950s. In 
other respects, many analysts cite the 1950s as high modernism, giving the 
term postmodern to aesthetic and philosophical trends and developments 
after 1968. The argument of this book places signs of postmodern innova-
tions in cultural practices beginning in the 1970s, and increasingly so in 
the following decades, to the end of the twentieth century. Postmodernity, 
in contrast, refers to the period roughly beginning with the twenty-first 
century and coincident with postcapitalism.
Opportunities for Liberation in Chaotic Interregna
During the periods of chaos between the end of one dominant world 
system and the emergence of another present opportunities for libera-
tion from repression. Repression is used in two different contexts. One is 
psychological, the Freudian kind of repression, and the other is political. 
Links are possible through the thought of Freud and Marx. In both, the 
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Freudian and Marxian sense, consciousness liberates decision making. 
Without consciousness, people are driven by forces outside their control. 
Unconscious impulses play the role on the psychological plane; propagan-
distic manipulation does it on the political. Liberation from both kinds of 
control calls for increased consciousness.
During periods of chaos, such as that beginning in the twenty-first 
century, strange attractors can produce a butterfly effect. That is, relatively 
small factors in initial conditions can produce great effects in a succeeding 
system. That possibility makes attempts to gain freedom from domination 
and achieve greater consciousness more possible. It also makes it more 
likely to affect future social conditions (Kellert 2008).
Late modern repression has taken several different but related forms. 
One is based on the actuarial society. The actuarial approach is a way to cal-
culate risk and take steps to reduce its extent (Feeley and Simon 1992). The 
other form is the control society. That approach uses techniques and tactics 
to control mass societies. These include, but are not limited to, physical 
force, propaganda, suppression of information, and obscurantism.
Fighting against both forms of repression entails getting one’s hands 
dirty. The sociologist of work, Everett C. Hughes (1958), spoke of the 
need for social researchers to get their hands dirty by direct observation 
of social acts and social relations. Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) used the dirty 
hands motif in a different context, that of the revolutionary. In both cases, 
greater consciousness, analytic understanding, and political praxis require 
involvement in social realities. Dirty hands also can imply a burden of guilt, 
as in Žižek’s (2008a:c.5) discussion of Leninist versus Stalinist objective 
guilt. Intellectuals play a vital role in liberation. Albert Camus authored one 
of the noteworthy discussions of that role in The Rebel (L’Homme Révolté 
1951), in which he argued, pace Descartes, I rebel, therefore we are.
Many of today’s intellectuals discussing ways to resist emerged from 
the crucible of 1968. Among the most notable, discussed in detail, are the 
relevant thoughts of Badiou, Rancière, and Žižek. Their ideas apply to a 
newly emerging world proletariat. This new proletariat occupies the fave-
las and banlieue of urban centers in the developing world.
These new proletarians can be mobilized partly through the work of 
intellectuals who can provide them with deconstructive and subversive 
discourses. Recognizing the emergence of iconocentric communication and 
consciousness, subversive discourses of resistance must use the iconic forms.
Structure of the Book
This first introductory chapter gives an overview of the argument of 
the book. Chapters 2 and 3 lay the theoretical foundations. Chapter 2 
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reviews the development of the capitalist world system and shows that 
capitalism as we know it has reached its senescence with its demise already 
underway. 
Chapter 2 also analyzes the development and role of the state in the 
exercise of social control. It begins with brief critical summaries of thought 
about the state from Aristotle, to Hobbes and other Enlightenment phi-
losophers, and finally twentieth century analysts like Weber, and Carl 
Schmitt. Late modern social analysts such as Pierre Bourdieu and his 
symbolic violence (1997), Michel Foucault’s governmentality (1978), 
and Jürgen Habermas’ communicative action (1984) have described state 
control and offered ways for people to enlarge their freedom from it. The 
analysis addresses the state as both a political and cultural institution. 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is contrasted to the authoritarian regimes 
of Fascism and Stalinist communism. It explicates strategies of authoritar-
ian control, and shows how the hegemonic approach under current liberal 
democracies is giving way to authoritarian strategies in advanced capitalist 
societies, especially the United States and Britain. 
The next three chapters address the control of the masses by elites 
in the late modern era. They offer a review of empirical data. Chapter 4 
shows how advanced capitalist states use law to terrorize domestic popula-
tions and populations in peripheral areas of the world system. Chapter 5 
examines how torture has played a prominent role in terror and control. 
Chapter 6 looks at physical restraint in the form of capital punishment, 
ghettos, prisons, gulags, and lagers combined with increasing reliance on 
technologies to surveil mass populations.
Chapter 7 traces the revolution in communication and consciousness 
that began around the mid-twentieth century. Using Peirce’s theory of 
semiosis, it shows how civilizations have relied on a logocentric form for 
two-and-a-half millennia. With the advent of electronic media, especially 
since the middle of the twentieth century, reliance is shifting to an icono-
centric approach. It describes a shift from verbal forms of communication 
and consciousness to those based on images.
In Chapter 8 the argument turns to the arts. It interrogates the arts 
to get a better grasp of the function of fear in the changing political 
economy—showing how the arts reflect and represent common sensi-
bilities, often presenting them in ways not yet articulated by discursive 
means.
Chapter 9 reviews means of social control over the masses by the  ruling 
elites. It shows how all forms of social control, formal and informal, have 
resisted liberation. The repressive apparatuses of the state depend on 
repressive cultural controls. Cultural controls help ensure repression of dis-
courses of liberations. They commonly do not rely on outright  censorship; 
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instead, they use control of mass media and implicit understandings of 
what counts as credible, and even how credibility is  measured.
The last chapter reviews various approaches to fighting against 
repression. It provides an analysis and critique of several popular inef-
fective approaches. Then it explicates and evaluates those that hold more 
promise. The last part of this chapter consists of a conclusion that points 
the way toward the specific kind of discourses of rebellion needed in the 
future.
